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INTRODUCTION
1

Like many landmark cases, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
has become more important with age, the plaudits and critiques
2
building a body of literature as influential as the case itself.
However, with every nuance dissected by generations of law students
and scholars, the real world relevance of these cases can sometimes
be lost, at least until the next big case that applies them. Youngstown
is no exception, and despite being one of the most cited and
3
celebrated cases in American jurisprudence, two recent Supreme
4
Court cases have quietly, and perhaps unintentionally, altered what is
5
arguably the most famous aspect of Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s
6
separation of powers framework for executive action.
There are relatively few Supreme Court cases that directly address
7
executive power, and before Youngstown there were very few that
directly restricted executive action, at least where the Commander in
1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 88–90 (2002) (detailing the many casebooks and legal articles
analyzing Youngstown and the various legal theories formulated to explain it).
3. See David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 155, 156 (2002) (finding Youngstown a landmark case “assured of
immortality in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 215, 217 (2002) (arguing that
Youngstown is one of the most important cases of all time and comparing the case
positively to Marbury v. Madison in terms of influence); William H. Rehnquist,
Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 753 (1986)
(describing Youngstown as a “very important constitutional case”).
4. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008) (changing the “zone of
twilight” category for executive action by requiring a lengthy history of congressional
support); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (holding that in
Jackson’s third category the President cannot disregard congressional limitation on
his power); infra Part III (analyzing the two cases and distilling a new standard for
Jackson’s taxonomy).
5. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 3, at 224 (explaining that Justice Jackson’s
concurrence has overshadowed Justice Black’s majority opinion in the eyes of legal
scholars).
6. See infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (describing Justice Jackson’s
taxonomy).
7. See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands
and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2008) (pointing out that the powers of
the other two branches of the federal government have received much more judicial
inquiry); cf. Thomas A. O’Donnell, Illuminating or Eliminating the Zone of Twilight:
Congressional Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 96 (1982) (portraying the Supreme Court as being “reluctant to examine the
President’s implied powers vis-a-vis Congress” for fear of touching on “political
questions”).
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8

Chief power was concerned. Youngstown is famous for being both an
9
implicit assertion of judicial review of executive action and an
explicit defense of congressional supremacy in legislative and
10
domestic affairs. However, it is Justice Jackson’s classification of the
strength of executive power based on congressional action or
inaction, his tripartite taxonomy, that dominated subsequent
11
separation of powers jurisprudence.
Justice Jackson broke his framework into three categories. The
first category applies when the President “acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress;” then his authority is at its
apogee, essentially representing the federal government as an
12
The second category is applicable when the
undivided whole.
President “acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority” and there is a “zone of twilight in which he and Congress
13
The third category is relevant
may have concurrent authority.”
when the President “takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress;” in that situation he may rely “only upon
his constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
14
Congress.” Although not initially adopted by the Court, Jackson’s
taxonomy is now recognized as the appropriate framework for
15
analyzing nearly all executive action, and accordingly a change in
the application of the taxonomy could affect the treatment of
executive powers in future cases.

8. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (remarking that the case was one of the
few times the Supreme Court refuted presidential power in a time of war (citing
Louis Fisher, Foreword to MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE
LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER, at ix (Duke Univ. Press 1994))); Heather J. Enlow,
Note, Inward v. Outward: The Limits of Presidential War Powers in the Domestic Sphere, 4
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 484 & n.6 (2006) (citing Ex Parte Merryman as the only
major example where a court restricted executive power before Youngstown).
9. See Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (asserting that Youngstown is, among other
things, remembered for the Court’s assertion of its authority to “review the legality of
an executive action”).
10. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)
(insisting that Congress is the sole legislator and that the President is obligated to
“execute[]” the law).
11. See infra note 15 (citing two Supreme Court cases that explicitly adopt
Jackson’s taxonomy as the appropriate lens to view executive action); infra note 64
and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson’s concurrence is primarily known
for his tripartite taxonomy).
12. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–36 (Jackson, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 637.
14. Id.
15. E.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“Justice Jackson’s
familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive
action.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (“[W]e have in the
past found and do today find Justice Jackson’s classification of executive actions into
three general categories analytically useful.”).
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The recently decided case of Medellin v. Texas is the latest
Supreme Court case to affirm Justice Jackson’s three-part test as the
17
Medellin is
appropriate framework to analyze executive power.
possibly better known for the Court’s characterization of the
18
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
19
(“Optional Protocol”) as a non-self-executing treaty, and for the
emergence of a new legal standard regarding treaties and their
20
domestic effect.
The majority’s other holding was just as
21
important, although less controversial: that the President did not
22
have the power, either through treaty or his inherent foreign affairs
23
power, to compel the state of Texas to give more judicial process to
convicted Mexican nationals who did not receive consular access as
required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
24
(“VCCR”). This holding is interesting not for the result but instead
for the way that the majority applied Jackson’s taxonomy to analyze
the President’s power.
The Court in Medellin applied Jackson’s taxonomy to hold that the
President’s attempt to enforce the decision of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) against Texas—based on authority granted by
the Optional Protocol—fell into Jackson’s third category, which is
applicable when the President takes an action contrary to Congress’s
16. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
17. Id. at 1368 (reiterating that Jackson’s taxonomy is the correct lens with which
to view assertions of executive power).
18. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325,
596 U.N.T.S. 487.
19. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
20. See id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that the new standard,
which requires explicit statements from Congress that a treaty is self-executing, erects
barriers to future treaties); Jordan J. Paust, Medellin, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties,
and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 328 (2008)
(asserting that the majority uses the wrong test for self-executing treaties and ignores
its own precedent).
21. Cf. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1390 (arguing that holding that the President does
not have the power to enforce the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) decision has
“broader implications than the majority suggests”).
22. Id. at 1371 (majority opinion).
23. Id. at 1372.
24. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (requiring that a signatory party notify nationals of other
signatory parties of their rights to consular access “without delay” after arrest). The
ICJ held that the United States violated its obligations under the VCCR and ordered
it to “provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentence” of the Mexican nationals. Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 73 (Mar. 31). President Bush
attempted to enforce this decision on Texas through his Memorandum for the
Attorney General of February 28, 2005. Memorandum from President George W.
Bush
to
the
Attorney
General
(Feb.
28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
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25

Underlying the Court’s
expressly or impliedly legislated will.
holding is the principle that when Congress and the President take
26
incompatible courses of action, Congress wins (a reasoning that
27
confirms a similar assertion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, another recent
28
Supreme Court case applying Jackson’s taxonomy). In addition, the
Court in Medellin rejected the argument that the President’s foreign
affairs power allows him to give domestic effect to the ICJ decision,
holding instead that action in Jackson’s “zone of twilight” is only
applicable when there is a long and confirmed history of
29
congressional acquiescence to the specific executive action.
This Comment will argue that the Court’s holding in Medellin
modifies Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy by effectively eliminating the
“zone of twilight.” By requiring a “systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
30
before questioned,” the Court is essentially extending the first
category—executive action with the express or implied authorization
of Congress—to cover the middle “zone of twilight.”
This
interpretation is at odds with the very purpose of the “zone of
twilight,” which applies to situations not falling into categories one or
three.
In addition, this Comment will argue that Hamdan establishes
Congress’s “disabling” power in the third category, which, combined
with Medellin’s interpretation, creates a new standard for Jackson’s
taxonomy, one more similar to Justice Black’s formalist majority
opinion in Youngstown than Justice Jackson’s functionalist concurring
31
opinion.
Formalism can be described as “insisting upon a firm
32
textual basis in the Constitution for any governmental act” and
maintaining clear constitutional roles for the branches of
25. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371.
26. See infra notes 151–153 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice
Robert’s holding).
27. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
28. See id. at 593 n.23 (2006) (placing President Bush’s military commissions into
Jackson’s third category where it automatically fails in the face of congressional
disapproval (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(Jackson, J., concurring))); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-inChief, and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
933, 960–61 (2007) (arguing that Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan
“skipped a few steps” by assuming that Congress automatically wins in third
category).
29. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372.
30. Id. at 1371–72 (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)).
31. See infra text accompanying note 169 (discussing Justice Black’s standard).
32. Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1523 (1991). See generally id. at 1523–29 (describing, comparing, and analyzing
formalist and functionalist arguments and cases).
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33

government, while functionalism allows governmental branches to
share some responsibilities as long as they do not “interfere[] with
34
Justice Black’s opinion
the core functions of another” branch.
insists on a clear constitutional basis for executive action or a clear
legislative grant of authority to the executive by Congress, while
Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” recognizes that in some cases the
35
executive can take action without either. This Comment will argue
that the new standard resembles Justice Black’s opinion more than
36
Justice Jackson’s.
Part II will give a background to Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown, and the effect that his tripartite taxonomy has had on
separation of powers issues, particularly focusing on the Court’s
adoption and interpretation of the taxonomy in Dames & Moore v.
37
Regan. Part III will analyze the Court’s treatment of the taxonomy in
Hamdan and Medellin and argue that the two cases create a new
standard, one that extends the first category to include a
longstanding history of congressional acquiescence, eliminates the
“zone of twilight,” and forecloses executive action in the third
category. Part IV analyzes potential ramifications of this new
standard on the executive’s foreign affairs and war powers, and Part V
concludes by calling for the Supreme Court to clarify whether the
new standard established by Hamdan and Medellin was intentional or
inadvertent.

33. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J.
679, 690 (1997) (maintaining that a formalist rubric assigns a certain function to a
branch—such as legislative, executive, or judicial—and then all powers deriving from
one of these functions are automatically and exclusively assigned to that branch).
34. Brown, supra note 32, at 1527; see id. at 1527–28 (stressing that functionalism
fosters greater “interdependence” between the branches and greater judicial
discretion to decide such cases).
35. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(majority opinion) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”), with id. at 635-37
(Jackson, J., concurring) (postulating that the Constitution bestows on the branches
“separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” and that in this
interdependence there is a “zone of twilight” in which the President and “Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain”).
36. See infra Part III.B (remarking that the new two-part standard for executive
power is more similar to Justice Black’s requirement of a statute or a textually based
constitutional power for executive action rather than Justice Jackson’s three part test
recognizing implied executive powers).
37. 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981). Although previous Supreme Court cases had cited
Jackson’s concurrence, Dames & Moore was the first to explicitly adopt his tripartite
taxonomy. See O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 99 (explaining that the Supreme Court
had “ignored” Jackson’s tripartite framework until Dames & Moore); Charles Tiefer,
War Decisions in the Late 1990s By Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 17 (1999) (opining that Jackson’s concurrence received “authoritative” acceptance
in Dames & Moore).

2009]
I.

FADE TO BLACK

671

BACKGROUND OF JACKSON’S CONCURRENCE IN YOUNGSTOWN
AND ITS EFFECT ON SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

In Medellin, Chief Justice Roberts authoritatively stated that “[t]he
President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental
power, ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
38
Constitution itself.’” This quote traces its origins to Justice Black’s
majority opinion in Youngstown, perhaps the most famous separation
39
of powers case in history, and stands for the unassuming notion that
40
executive power has definitive limits. That Justice Black needed to
make the statement at all reflects the great difficulty in defining the
41
scope of the President’s powers and the historical tendency of the
executive branch to assert the broadest possible interpretation of its
42
powers. On June 2, 1952, the Supreme Court famously announced
one limit on executive power: President Truman could not, as an
extension of his inherent Commander in Chief powers, seize private
property in a way that directly contravenes procedures enacted by
43
That this assertion seems unexceptionable now
Congress.
44
demonstrates the power and continuing effect of Youngstown.
A. The “Steel Seizure” Case
On April 8, 1952, President Truman told the nation that he was
ordering Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the nation’s
45
steel mills. The undeclared war in Korea was raging on, and the
fear was that an impending steel workers strike would hinder the war
38. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S.
at 585).
39. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 156 (stating that, after Youngstown, “all other
[separation of powers] cases pale into insignificance”); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 215–
17 (arguing that Youngstown has influenced “nearly every constitutional issue of war
and peace, foreign policy, domestic legislative power, presidential power, and even
judicial power” occurring in the last fifty years).
40. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (emphasizing that Youngstown “reaffirmed
the principle of presidential subordination to the rule of law”).
41. See id. at 163 (asserting that the issue of presidential inherent emergency
power has “long been the subject of debate”).
42. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 7, at 506 (arguing that presidential power “has
been expanding since the Founding,” in part because of the nature of the executive
branch).
43. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588-89.
44. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008) (citing Jackson’s
concurrence for support of the separation of powers nature of the Constitution);
Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220 (2008) (citing Youngstown to support a
decision to rule on the merits because of the time-sensitive nature of the foreign
policy issues in the case).
45. See MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 80–84 (1977) (explaining that President Truman announced
his intentions in a national radio address while concurrently signing Executive Order
10340).

672

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:665

46

Declaring that the closure of the steel mills would be a
effort.
national emergency, the President cited his inherent powers as
47
Commander in Chief and explained that the measures Congress
48
49
had enacted were not sufficient to meet the emergency. The next
day, attorneys for The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company filed a
motion for a temporary restraining order of the President’s Executive
50
Less than two months later the Supreme Court decided
Order.
51
Youngstown, a remarkable decision containing seven opinions, five of
52
them concurrences.
Justice Black, writing for the majority, penned a brisk and
formalistic opinion categorically rejecting President Truman’s
53
After dealing with a nonauthority to seize the steel mills.
constitutional procedural issue, Justice Black began by framing the
limits of executive power in terms of delegation by statute or explicit
54
constitutional grant of authority. Justice Black found no statutory
support for the seizure of the steel mills and stated that the
legislation that authorized executive seizure of private property
delineated conditions not met by President Truman’s Executive
55
Order.
Similarly, President Truman could not rely on his
46. Id. at 80.
47. See id. at 84 (observing that the Executive Order cited the President’s
authority as based on “the Constitution . . . and as President of the United States and
Commander in Chief”); id. at 119 (stating that the government’s reasoning was more
fully explained as being based on “Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Article II . . . and whatever
inherent, implied or residual powers may flow therefrom”).
48. See id. at 122–23 (remarking that the President cited the Taft-Hartley Act, the
Selective Service Act, and the Defense Production Act).
49. See id. at 80 (explaining that the President feared that measures under the
Taft-Hartley act would have taken too long, and that there would have been a short
interruption in steel production).
50. Id. at 102–03.
51. See id. at 83–84, 195 (relating that President Truman signed Executive Order
10340 on April 8, 1952, and the Supreme Court released its ruling on June 2, 1952).
52. See generally Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 401–21 (2002) (listing the seven opinions and analyzing
the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions). Justice Black wrote the opinion
of the Court, with Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, and Burton joining in the
opinion and writing separate concurrences. Id. Justice Clark joined in the
judgment, but not the opinion, and also penned his own decision. Id. Justice Vinson
wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Reed and Minton. Id. The opinions
of Justices Clark, Douglas, Burton, and Vinson have had a minimal impact and are
not analyzed in this Comment.
53. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1523, 1527 & nn.55, 59 (using Justice Black’s
opinion in Youngstown as an example of formalism and contrasting it with Justice
Jackson’s functionalist concurrence); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 691 & n.28
(labeling Justice Black’s opinion as an “exaggerated” and “stark” example of
formalism). But cf. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 225-26 (insisting that Justice Black’s
opinion, although short, is a “masterpiece,” and completely compatible with Justice
Jackson’s longer opinion).
54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
55. Id. at 585–86.
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constitutional powers because the Executive Order seizing the steel
56
Justice
mills was a legislative act that only Congress could take.
Black boiled executive power down to a two-part test: does the
President have the authorization of Congress, and if not, does he
57
have power derived from a textual grant of the Constitution?
Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion, in part because he
58
felt that Justice Black’s opinion was too simplistic. While Justice
Black appeared to view the situation in stark terms—either the
President had the power or he did not—Justice Frankfurter refused
to consider whether President Truman would have had the power to
59
seize the steel mills had Congress never legislated on the subject.
What was crucial for Justice Frankfurter was that Congress had, at
least in his opinion, legislated on the subject, and the President could
60
not ignore the law.
The majority and concurring opinions range from formalistic
61
(Justice Black) to relatively functional (Justice Frankfurter). What
united the Justices in the majority is the fact that Congress had
legislated on the issue, and the President was compelled, at least in
62
this case, to follow its wishes. Justice Jackson agreed with this basic
56. See id. at 587–89 (examining and rejecting the government’s constitutional
arguments for an implied power based on an “aggregate of [President Truman’s]
powers” under Article II of the Constitution because the executive order was an
Article I legislative act); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 691–92 (explaining that
regardless of the source of the power Justice Black perceived President Truman’s
usurpation of both policy and method as an inherently legislative, not executive,
action).
57. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”).
58. See id. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he principles of the
separation of powers seem . . . more complicated and flexible than . . . what Mr.
Justice Black has written.”).
59. Id. at 597. Justice Frankfurter appeared to want to limit the impact of
Youngstown to the issue at hand, and his most influential statements have a
functionalist and situation specific feel; see id. (“The great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.” (citing Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); id. at 610–11
(“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as gloss on ‘executive
Power.’”); see also MARCUS, supra note 45, at 203 (relating that “Frankfurter
approached the merits of the case more narrowly” and resolved to “make no
sweeping statement on presidential power”).
60. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 105 (positing that despite Frankfurter’s
apparent disagreement with Black over the presence of implied presidential powers
the dispositive fact was that Congress had legislated on the subject).
61. See Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 692–94 & n.33 (portraying Justice Douglas’s
concurring opinion as being almost as formalistically “stark” as Justice Black’s but
that the other majority opinions possessed varying degrees of flexibility).
62. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 99 (arguing that the case was decided not on
whether the seizure was “a legislative act or on a rejection of broad presidential
powers” but on the “perception that the President’s action . . . conflicted . . . with . . .
Congress”); Fitzgerald, supra note 33, at 696–98 (summarizing that all the justices in
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assertion, and the reason his opinion became the one most
63
celebrated in both courtrooms and classrooms alike was that, quite
64
simply, he came up with a system.
B. Justice Jackson’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Jackson prefaced his taxonomy by emphasizing the elastic
65
nature of executive power. This concept, seemingly at odds with
Justice Black’s rigid characterization of executive power, is placed in
the context of a federal government that “disperse[s] [its] powers
66
His taxonomy should thus be
into a workable government.”
analyzed with the mindset that the powers of the executive and
67
legislative branches are not “‘hermetically’ sealed” but instead have
an inter-relational nature, a concept that becomes most apparent in
the “zone of twilight.”
Justice Jackson’s first category placed the President at the apex of
his powers when acting with the “express or implied authorization of
68
Congress.” Jackson explained that in these situations the President
represents the federal government as a unified body, and in order for
the judiciary to overrule executive action it must decide that the
69
government itself lacks the power. Jackson finished his description
by stating that executive action under this category would be given
the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation” and “supported by the
70
strongest of presumptions.”
the majority agreed that “the Constitution gives Congress alone the power” to seize
the steel mills, and that by taking “legislative” action Congress pre-empted President
Truman).
63. See Bellia, supra note 2, at 89 n.11 (citing a number of distinguished legal
scholars who state that Jackson’s concurrence is the preferred jurisprudential lens
with which to view separation of powers); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use
and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 62 (2002)
(remarking that of all the opinions in Youngstown, “Justice Jackson’s concurrence
may have been the most important”); supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text
(listing court cases following and applying Jackson’s concurrence).
64. See, e.g., Bryant & Tobias, supra note 52, at 410 (explaining that although
Jackson’s concurrence is important for many reasons, it is “principally renowned” for
his tripartite taxonomy).
65. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”).
66. See id. (declaring that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity” and cannot be based
on “isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context”).
67. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 121 (1976)).
68. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (stating that in the first category the
President’s “authority is at its maximum” because it “includes all he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate”).
69. Id. at 636–37.
70. Id. at 637.
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The third category in Jackson’s taxonomy showed the President’s
71
power at its “lowest ebb” when the Executive takes an action that is
72
clearly against the “express or implied” will of Congress. Jackson
speculated that the Supreme Court would have to reject Congress’s
power to act in the disputed area in order to “sustain exclusive
Presidential control,” and that any claim to exclusive control must be
73
carefully examined.
Significantly, Jackson did not assume that
74
Congress would always win in category three, although the examples
he cited for presidential supremacy hinge on textual grants of power
to the President in the Constitution rather than the implied powers at
75
issue in the case.
Finally, Jackson’s second, or “zone of twilight,” category references
the first and third categories by analyzing executive action “in [the]
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of [executive]
76
authority.” In these situations, the President must have some basis
for independent constitutional power, but there also exists a “zone of
twilight” where the President and Congress have overlapping or
77
indistinct powers. In these situations, Jackson stated that a lack of
78
congressional action may necessitate executive action. In addition,
Jackson insisted that implementation of executive power in the “zone
of twilight” would “depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables” as opposed to “abstract theories of
79
law.” Although there are many opinions as to the exact meaning
80
and application of the “zone of twilight,” it is, at a minimum,
71. See id. (insisting that the President “can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 637–38.
74. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 960 (remarking that Justice Jackson spent many
pages of his opinion on whether President Truman’s actions might trump Congress’s
statutes).
75. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638 n.4 (using the President’s “exclusive power of
removal in executive agencies” as an example (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52 (1926))).
76. Id. at 637.
77. Id.
78. See id. (theorizing that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence”
could “enable, if not invite measures on independent presidential responsibility”).
79. Id.
80. See O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 112 (insisting that “zone of twilight”
acquiescence requires “actual notice” to Congress of the President’s intentions and
an opportunity for Congress to respond); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 230 (describing
Jackson’s “zone of twilight” as a default rule when the line between presidential and
congressional power is not clear); Rebecca A. D’Arcy, Note, The Legacy of Dames &
Moore v. Regan: The Twilight Zone of Concurrent Authority Between the Executive and
Congress and a Proposal for a Judicially Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 291, 310 (2003) (arguing that precedent shows a “zone of concurrent
authority” for which there is no legal standard or “clearly articulated principle”).
The difficulty in defining a clear standard for the “zone of twilight” was foreseen by
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defined by the absence of congressional action, positive or negative,
and the presence of some constitutional basis for presidential
81
power. Put a slightly different way, resorting to a “zone of twilight”
analysis should occur only after an analysis under categories one and
82
three is inconclusive.
Jackson applied his taxonomy to the facts of Youngstown and
immediately dismissed the possibility of the steel seizure falling into
83
first category because Congress had never authorized it. Jackson
eliminated President Truman’s action from the “zone of twilight”
category because Congress had legislated in that area; President
Truman chose a method inconsistent with the statutes passed by
Congress and could not claim that his actions were “necessitated or
84
invited” from the absence of congressional legislation. This left the
steel seizure in the “severe tests” of the last category, where Jackson
found no basis for presidential supremacy in the face of explicit
85
congressional disapproval.
Like the other Justices siding with the majority in Youngstown,
Justice Jackson essentially held that President Truman was unable to
86
seize the steel mills in the face of contrary legislation. What was
revolutionary about his opinion was that he took what Youngstown
stood for—a restriction of unbridled executive power and an
affirmation of the separation of powers doctrine—and gave it a
87
That Youngstown and
flexible matrix to apply to future cases.
Jackson’s taxonomy would be so important was by no means
88
immediately clear, but thirty years after the Supreme Court decided
Jackson when he said that any test will rely on “the imperatives of events” rather than
on “abstract theories of law.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637; see also Bellia, supra note 2,
at 146 (referring to the preceding quote and remarking “[i]f Justice Jackson’s
statement was purely predictive, he was right”).
81. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 230–31 (interpreting the “zone of twilight” as a
rule of judicial deference applied when executive action is not unconstitutional but
an analysis of the first and third categories does not provide an answer).
82. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (explaining that “[w]hen the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” he acts in a “zone of
twilight”).
83. Id. at 638.
84. Id. at 639.
85. See id. at 640–55 (exploring and rejecting the government’s textual and
implied powers arguments for the steel seizure).
86. Id. at 639–55 (placing President Truman’s Executive Order into the third
category where it fails in the face of contrary legislation).
87. See id. at 635 (describing his taxonomy as an “over-simplified” but “practical”
grouping for executive power).
88. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 157 (“It is doubtful that even the most
prescient of soothsayers could have foreseen the emergence of a landmark
case . . . .”); Bellia, supra note 2, at 88 (reporting that the case seemed “destined to be
ignored” (quoting Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., The Steel Case: Presidential Responsibility
and Judicial Irresponsibility, W. POL. SCI. Q. 61, 65 (1953))); Paulsen, supra note 3, at
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Youngstown, Jackson’s taxonomy would take center stage in Dames &
89
Moore v. Regan.
C. Dames & Moore and the Application of Jackson’s Tripartite Taxonomy
In the years after Youngstown, Jackson’s taxonomy had been
90
analytically useful in lower court opinions, but in Dames & Moore,
the Supreme Court explicitly adopted Jackson’s taxonomy, which
91
until then was only dicta.
The Supreme Court—in an opinion
penned by then Associate Justice Rehnquist—applied Jackson’s
taxonomy to analyze the balance of power between the President and
Congress and unanimously upheld executive orders nullifying,
voiding, suspending, and transferring U.S. claims against Iranian
92
interests to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal.
The Court first held that the executive orders authorizing the
nullification of attachments to Iranian property and the transfer of
that property overseas fell into the first category of Jackson’s
93
taxonomy because they were explicitly authorized by statute.
217 (explaining that the remarkable impact of Youngstown was not “obvious or
inevitable in 1952”).
89. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
90. See, e.g., Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 224 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
Jackson’s taxonomy for the proposition that the President must rely on his own
constitutional powers for any action taken that does not have the express or implied
authorization of Congress); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 392
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Jackson’s third category for the concept that Supreme Court
jurisprudence does not support deference to executive actions when they contravene
congressional statutes); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 598 F.2d 759, 775 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that the government’s actions did
not fall into Jackson’s “zone of twilight” because Congress had clearly legislated to
the contrary).
91. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 661, 669 (pronouncing that Jackson’s
concurrence “brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as
there is in this area” and that the Court found “Justice Jackson’s classification of
executive actions . . . analytically useful”); see also O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 99
(stating that the Supreme Court had “ignored” Jackson’s taxonomy until Dames &
Moore); Mark S. Rosen, Revisiting Youngstown: Against the View that Jackson’s
Concurrence Resolves the Relation Between Congress and Commander-in-Chief, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1703, 1711 n.22 (2007) (insisting that Dames & Moore, which adopted Jackson’s
taxonomy, did not undermine its reasoning).
92. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669, 688. Before getting to the substance of the
opinion, Justice Rehnquist remarked generally about the purpose and scope of
Jackson’s taxonomy, stating that there was a “spectrum” of executive action—
running from unambiguous “congressional authorization” to unequivocal
“congressional prohibition”—that was particularly appropriate when dealing with an
international emergency that Congress could not have anticipated. Id. at 669. This
declaration echoes the functionalist outlook of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in
Youngstown. See supra notes 59, 65–66 (quoting functionalist language in Justices
Frankfurter’s and Jackson’s Youngstown opinions).
93. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 669–75 (citing the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (Supp. III 1976)). Despite legislative
history that suggested Congress did not intend to give the President such “extensive
power,” the Court held that the plain language of the statute gave the President the
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However, the Court did not find congressional authorization for the
President to “suspend” claims pending in court and therefore this
94
Instead, the Court
action could not fall into the first category.
placed the suspension of claims into the “zone of twilight” category,
arguing that the “general tenor” of congressional action indicated
“acceptance of a broad scope for executive action” in these
95
situations. The Court interpreted the entire history of congressional
approval of executive claims settlement as tantamount to “a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned” which “may
96
be treated as a gloss on ‘Executive Power.’” The Court drew this
conclusion despite the fact that the Court cited no prior instances of
the specific action taken by the President, the suspension of claims
97
pending in federal district court.
Legal scholars have criticized Dames & Moore for blurring the lines
between Jackson’s three categories by “allowing congressional
opposition . . . to be interpreted as congressional silence; or allowing
congressional silence . . . to be interpreted as congressional
98
approval.”
This was viewed as betraying the very purpose of
Youngstown, the restriction of executive power, by giving the President
99
too much latitude. In addition, at least one scholar argued that the
Court adopted a section of Frankfurter’s concurrence—“a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
very power that he was claiming. See id. at 672 (“We . . . refuse to read out of § 1702
all meaning to the words ‘transfer,’ ‘compel,’ or ‘nullify.’”).
94. Id. at 675. The Court also distinguished several arguments to the effect that
suspending claims pending in court actually falls into Jackson’s third category. See id.
at 681–86 (arguing that, despite the limiting and contradictory language of several
congressional statutes, Congress had accepted presidential authority to settle claims).
95. Id. at 677–78. First, the Court argued that just because the relevant statutes
did not specifically approve suspension of claims, this did not mean that Congress
disapproved, especially in the “areas of foreign policy and national security.” Id. at
678 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)). Next, the Court asserted that
the long history of congressional acquiescence and delegation in the area of
international claims settlement shows that “Congress has implicitly approved the
practice of claims settlement by executive agreement.” Id. at 680. Finally, the Court
pointed to a series of statutes where Congress had either not questioned the
President’s authority to settle claims disputes or explicitly authorized future
settlements. Id. at 680–83.
96. Id. at 686 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
97. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1165 (2008) (contending that the Court cited all pre-FSIA cases for
congressional acquiescence and could show no previous instances of “presidential
suspension of pending lawsuits”).
98. Bellia, supra note 2, at 145.
99. See D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 293–94 (describing Dames & Moore as a
“politically motivated aberration” rather than a “clear application of Youngstown”).

2009]

FADE TO BLACK

679
100

Congress and never before questioned” —as the definition of
101
The Court, however, appears to
actions in the “zone of twilight.”
have used this quote as representative of congressional acquiescence
of executive claims settlement agreements, rather than as a definition
102
of “zone of twilight” situations.
Despite the controversial nature of the Court’s opinion in Dames &
Moore, it remained the most exhaustive application of Jackson’s
taxonomy until Medellin, and although subsequent Supreme Court
cases have cited Dames & Moore, none challenged its interpretation of
103
Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy.
II. HAMDAN AND MEDELLIN CREATE A NEW FORMALISTIC STANDARD
FOR JACKSON’S TAXONOMY THAT ELIMINATES THE
“ZONE OF TWILIGHT” CATEGORY
In the years following Dames & Moore, legal scholars remarked on
the use of Jackson’s taxonomy to expand executive power, pointing
out the dichotomy of using a seminal case restricting presidential
104
power to enlarge it.
Recently, however, the Court has applied
Jackson’s taxonomy to restrict the use of executive power; first in
105
Hamdan and then in Medellin. This Part will argue that the Court’s
application of Jackson’s taxonomy in Hamdan and Medellin creates a
new standard for analyzing executive power that effectively eliminates
the “zone of twilight” and requires the President to rely on a statutory
100. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11.
101. See, e.g., O’Donnell, supra note 7, at 111 (arguing that Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence helps to define Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight” taxonomy).
Although not the only interpretation of Dames & Moore, O’Donnell’s argument is
prescient because Chief Justice Roberts appears to adopt this standard in Medellin;
the crucial distinction is that while O’Donnell believed this standard would allow
almost unlimited executive action, Chief Justice Roberts appears to use it to restrict
most executive action. See infra Part III.B (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts uses
Justice Frankfurter’s language to bar actions in the “zone of twilight” not based on a
longstanding history of congressional acquiescence).
102. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (detailing evidence
supporting the executive orders and positively comparing it to the Frankfurter
quote). This interpretation is supported by the fact that Justice Rehnquist went
through great pains to stress that Dames & Moore had been decided “on the
narrowest possible ground,” which militates against the implementation of a general
“zone of twilight” standard. Id. at 660, 688.
103. Cf. D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 293 & n.9 (stating that Dames & Moore has
become “part of the mainstream executive-powers jurisprudence” and listing a
number of cases following it).
104. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1311 (1988) (insisting that
Dames & Moore “undercuts Youngstown’s vision of a balanced national security
process”).
105. See infra Part III.A–B (observing that Hamdan held against President Bush’s
military commissions and Medellin refused to enforce President Bush’s
Memorandum).
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grant of authority or a textual grant of power in the Constitution, a
standard that more closely resembles Justice Black’s formalist opinion
106
than Justice Jackson’s functionalist approach.
A. Hamdan Implements a “Disabling” Congress Standard in the
Third Category of Jackson’s Taxonomy
107

Hamdan reveals a new understanding of Jackson’s third category
by assuming that when Congress and the President disagree,
108
Congress prevails.
Jackson himself did not assume that when
Congress and the President disagree that Congress necessarily wins,
109
“disabling” executive action.
Nevertheless, scholars have asserted
that this assumption must follow from the structure of the
Constitution and the relative roles of the executive and legislative
110
111
branches, at least where constitutional powers are not involved.

106. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(majority opinion) (“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem from
an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”), with id. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”).
107. The facts of Hamdan are briefly as follows: The petitioner, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, was an enemy combatant captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and held by the
U.S. military at the prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 566 (2006). In 2003, Hamdan was charged with conspiracy to commit various
offenses and tried by a military commission convened by President Bush. Id.
Hamdan brought habeas corpus and mandamus petitions asserting that President
Bush lacked the authority to convene military commissions, and that the military
commissions “violate[d] the most basic tenets of military and international law.” Id.
at 567. The district court granted Hamdan’s writ of habeas corpus, but the court of
appeals reversed, and Hamdan appealed to the Supreme Court. Id.
108. See infra notes 126–132 and accompanying text (analyzing Hamdan and
concluding that the principle of a disabling Congress is the most straightforward
interpretation of Hamdan’s application of Jackson’s third category).
109. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson himself
spent many pages discussing whether President Truman’s justifications trumped
congressional will).
110. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1703, 1714–16 (explaining that most scholars
seem to accept a “categorical congressional supremacy,” a similar terminology to a
“disabling” Congress).
111. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 88
(2d ed. 1996) (describing various presidential powers, primarily rooted textually in
the Constitution, over which Congress has no authority). For instance, it is
universally accepted that Congress could not tell the President where to move his
troops during a war or enter into treaty negotiations against the will of the President.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President Shall be Commander and Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties . . . .”); HENKIN, supra, at 88 (emphasizing that even “champions of
maximum Congressional authority” would not dispute the President’s treaty making
or commander in chief powers).
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The Supreme Court appears to adopt this interpretation of Jackson’s
112
third category in Hamdan.
The Court in Hamdan did not attempt a thorough application of
Jackson’s taxonomy, and Hamdan itself, particularly the majority
opinion, is arguably better viewed as primarily a statutory
113
interpretation case and not as a discourse on separation of powers.
Indeed, although the concurring opinions provide more substance to
the constitutional issues in the case, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion
114
only directly refers to Jackson’s taxonomy in a footnote.
At issue in Hamdan was whether procedures enacted by President
Bush for military commissions trying enemy combatants violated
115
federal and international law. A majority of the Court held that the
military commissions were unlawful because their “structure and
procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice
116
(“UCMJ”) and the Geneva Conventions,” placing the commissions
in Jackson’s third category despite the fact that it was not clear that
117
Congress intended to restrict executive action in this way.
The question behind all of this is whether President Bush, as
Commander in Chief, had the authority to convene military
commissions regardless of contrary or inconsistent congressional
118
Justice Stevens treated the debate as a minor, and
legislation.
apparently long-resolved, issue, devoting only a small footnote and
112. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1709 (admitting that the theory of a disabling
Congress may have been “settled” in part by Hamdan); Vladeck, supra note 28 at 939
(stating that that the “elegant simplicity” of the disabling Congress theory is
“thematically at the heart of the Hamdan opinions of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and
Breyer”). But see id. at 940 (suggesting that it may be “too simplistic” to read Hamdan
this way).
113. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 957–58 (emphasizing that the majority never
decided any “constitutional question,” but instead focused on the procedures
enacted by Congress); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National
Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (stating that Justice
Stevens’s majority opinion “purported to adhere closely to the text, context, and
history of the relevant provisions” rather than demanding an explicit congressional
authorization for the military commissions).
114. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006).
115. See also id. at 567 (remarking that the most important issue was whether “a
defendant must be permitted to see and hear the evidence against him”).
116. Id.
117. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 959–60 (suggesting that the evidence that the
procedures enacted for military commissions were intended to be exhaustive was less
persuasive than in previous executive powers cases). This interpretation makes
Hamdan a kind of anti-Dames & Moore. See supra text accompanying note 98
(explaining that the criticism leveled at Dames & Moore was that the Court was willing
to interpret legislation that was arguably restricting presidential power as actually
enabling executive action in the first and second categories of Jackson’s taxonomy).
118. See Vladeck, supra note 28, at 957 (stating that “Hamdan thus squarely raised
the question of whether congressional limits on presidential authority were
enforceable”).
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119

Justice Stevens asserted that “the President . . .
one citation to it.
may not disregard limitations that Congress has . . . placed on his
120
This
powers,” and cited Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown.
citation to Jackson’s concurrence assumes that Jackson himself
viewed the third category as a “disabling zone” where Congress
121
necessarily wins, which is by no means apparent.
Because Justice Stevens devotes such a small space to such a big
topic, it would be tempting to write it off as dicta, but this point is a
necessary part of the Court’s argument and thus has precedential
122
Although Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion embarked
value.
123
on a more generous application of Jackson’s taxonomy, it also
assumed that because President Bush acted in the third category, he
124
had no choice but to follow Congress’s guidelines. Justice Breyer’s
short concurring opinion contained no discussion of Jackson’s
taxonomy but did explicitly affirm Congress’s disabling power over
125
the President.
The most straightforward interpretation of Hamdan’s application of
Jackson’s taxonomy is that where Congress and the President
disagree, Congress always wins, except perhaps where the President

119. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military
commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise
of its own war powers, placed on his powers.” (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring))); see also Vladeck, supra
note 28, at 935–36, 940 (suggesting that Hamdan’s apparent support of the
congressional disabling theory was merely re-affirming the Supreme Court view
prevalent before the rise of Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence).
120. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
121. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that Jackson did not
make this assumption in Youngstown). But see Rosen, supra note 91, at 1705–06
(arguing the opposite: that in the third category Jackson assumed that the
“president is categorically bound to follow what Congress lays down”).
122. See Rosen, supra note 91, at 1710 n.21 (arguing that without this assumption
the Court could not state that the military commissions were constrained by contrary
statute). This view was also supported by the concurring opinions of Justices
Kennedy and Breyer. See infra notes 123–125 (concluding that both Justice Kennedy
and Justice Breyer found statutes conflicting with President Bush’s military
commissions, and both held that the statutes prevailed).
123. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638–39, 643–44, 652–55 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(affirming Jackson’s taxonomy as “[t]he proper framework for assessing whether
Executive actions are authorized” before concluding that the military commissions
violated several provisions of the UCMJ and was thus in the third of Jackson’s
categories, where it presumptively failed).
124. See id. at 643, 653 (asserting that the “special military commission . . . must
satisfy Common Article 3[]” and “we must apply the standards Congress has
provided”).
125. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Congress has denied the President the
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here.”).

2009]

FADE TO BLACK

683
126

This would
can find a textual grant of power in the Constitution.
apply both when Congress can point to a textual grant, as in
127
Hamdan, and where the President and Congress have concurrent
and relatively undefined powers, most noticeably in the foreign
128
affairs and war powers fields. In addition, it would have been easy
for the majority and concurring opinions in Hamdan to link
129
Congress’s disabling power to its constitutional grants of power, but
not one of them directly did. Justices Kennedy and Breyer did not
even discuss Congress’s source of power to make legislation in the
field of military justice, apparently relying on Justice Stevens’s
130
These bald statements of congressional supremacy make
opinion.
this interpretation the most obvious conclusion, arguably supported
131
by the weight of scholarship. Finally, at least one circuit court judge
132
appears to cite Hamdan for this interpretation.
126. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV.
689, 737–38 (2008) (citing Hamdan’s footnote 23 and its assertion that Congress has
a “virtually irrebutable presumption of supremacy” over the President in a dispute
over war powers and suggesting that this supremacy might not apply to some
executive power grounded in Article II); supra note 111 and accompanying text
(pointing out that textually based constitutional powers are presumably
uninfringeable).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“To define and punish . . . Offenses against the
Law of Nations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (“To make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces . . . .”); see Hamdan, 548
U.S. at 591–92 (majority opinion) (counterbalancing congressional textual war
powers against presidential textual war powers).
128. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 87 (“In foreign affairs, much of the authority of
the federal government is not explicitly allocated to either branch, and even the
explicit division of power between President and Congress conforms to no ‘natural’
separation of executive from legislative powers . . . .”).
129. See supra note 127 (citing the relevant constitutional provisions to
congressional power in Hamdan).
130. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 653 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I see no need to
consider several further issues addressed in the plurality opinion by Justice
Stevens . . . .”).
131. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (asserting that most scholars
support the basic assumption that Congress wins a conflict with the President). But
see Vladeck, supra note 28, at 9 (suggesting that another way to analyze Hamdan’s
treatment of Jackson’s third category is to vary Congress’s disabling power on a
sliding scale according to the source of the legislative power). In the case of
Hamdan, the congressional power to pass the legislation in question was drawn from
textual grants in the Constitution and so would represent an absolute case of
congressional supremacy. Id. Where power between the President and Congress is
concurrent and undefined, the assumption of congressional supremacy might not be
as strong. Id. Although a more flexible theory, the lack of a de facto winner where
there is no “textual prerogative” to either side still leaves questions, and the
statements of the majority and concurring opinions in Hamdan do not seem to
recognize such fine distinctions. See supra notes 119, 123–125 and accompanying text
(citing the majority and concurring opinions and showing they give Congress a
categorical disabling power). Finally, because most executive war powers are
implied, a hypothetical case where implied executive power defeats implied
congressional power in the third category suggests an executive implied power
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Hamdan suggested a new standard for Jackson’s third category but
did not explore the “zone of twilight” at all, although Justice Stevens’s
majority opinion left open the possibility that President Bush might
have had the power to establish military commissions absent
133
congressional legislation. In addition to being widely supported by
134
legal scholars, the disabling Congress theory articulated by Hamdan
might not have been, by itself, a dramatic alteration of Jackson’s
taxonomy because it was already difficult for the executive branch to
135
Medellin, however, embarked
overcome a congressional mandate.
on the most extended application of Jackson’s taxonomy by the
Supreme Court since Dames & Moore. In the end, Medellin establishes
a new standard for presidential power in the “zone of twilight,” or at
least severely restricts its use, and combined with Hamdan heralds a
136
more formalistic application of Jackson’s taxonomy.

supremacy for which there is no clear support. See Barron & Lederman., supra note
126, at 736 n.144 (arguing that a sliding scale disabling theory has no real
jurisprudential basis).
132. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 717–19 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J.,
dissenting) (citing footnote 23 in Hamdan for the proposition that Congress’s
enactment of FISA and Title III disables President Bush’s warrantless wiretapping
program absolutely).
133. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 592–93 & n.23 (majority opinion) (remarking that
“[w]hether Chief Justice Chase was correct in suggesting that the President may
constitutionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of Congress’ . . .
is a question this Court . . . need not answer today,” and continuing later, “[w]hether
or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to
convene military commissions,” he must follow explicit congressional guidelines).
Presumably, presidential enactment of military commissions “absent congressional
authorization” would fall into the “zone of twilight.” Id. at 593 n.23.
134. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 126, at 949 (arguing that history
supports the assertion that the President is compelled to abide by legislative
restrictions).
135. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (relating that the Court would have to disable Congress
from acting on the measure entirely). But see Barron & Lederman., supra note 126,
at 693–94 (arguing that the most important issues in separation of powers
jurisprudence will revolve around Jackson’s third category).
136. See infra Part III.B (asserting that Medellin eliminates the “zone of twilight”
and, with a third category that disables Congress, resembles Justice Black’s test).
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B. Medellin Eliminates the “Zone of Twilight” By Requiring Longstanding
Congressional Support for Executive Action
137

Medellin establishes a new interpretation of Jackson’s taxonomy
by requiring a longstanding practice of congressional acquiescence to
a specific executive action before it can exist in the “zone of
138
139
Chief Justice Roberts prefaced his analysis by quoting
twilight.”
Justice Black’s majority opinion, that “[t]he President’s authority to
act . . . ‘must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
140
Constitution itself.’” This formalist quote provides the appropriate
lens through which to view the rest of Chief Justice Roberts’s
application of Jackson’s taxonomy.
After reaffirming Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy as the “accepted
141
framework for evaluating executive action in this area,” Chief
Justice Roberts broke the analysis into two separate parts, focusing on
the two claimed sources of presidential power—the “treaty power”
142
and the “dispute- resolution” power—to enforce the ICJ ruling.
The first part eliminated the possibility of President Bush’s Executive
Memorandum—obligating the states to follow the ICJ decision—
137. The facts of Medellin are briefly as follows: Jose Ernesto Medellin, the
petitioner in the case, was convicted in Texas state court for murder. Medellin v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008). In violation of the VCCR, Medellin, a Mexican
national, was not given consular access after he was arrested. Id. at 1352. In 2004,
the ICJ ruled that the United States was obligated by the VCCR to give Medellin and
fifty other Mexican nationals “review and reconsideration of their state-court
convictions.” Id. In 2005, President Bush issued an Executive Memorandum stating
that under his authority the United States would honor the ICJ ruling by obligating
state courts to “give effect to the decision.” Id. at 1353 (internal quotations omitted).
Texas state courts refused to honor both the ICJ decision and the President’s
Memorandum, in part because Medellin had not timely raised the Vienna
Convention claim at trial, and because neither the ICJ nor the President has the
authority to set aside state procedural rules. Id. at 1356. Medellin appealed to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 1353.
138. See infra Part III.B (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s application of Jackson’s
taxonomy).
139. In an aside, it is fitting that Chief Justice Roberts wrote the most exhaustive
application of Jackson’s taxonomy since Dames & Moore, because Roberts clerked for
Justice Rehnquist when Rehnquist penned Dames & Moore. See The Justices of the
Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (explaining that Roberts clerked for Rehnquist during the
1980 term, the same term that Dames & Moore was decided). This occurrence is even
more remarkable for the fact that Rehnquist himself clerked for Justice Jackson when
Jackson wrote his Youngstown concurrence. See Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 752–53
(relating that he was very familiar with Youngstown because he clerked for Justice
Jackson when the case was decided).
140. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585).
141. Id.
142. See id. (recounting how the United States argued that (1) the “relevant
treaties give the President the authority to implement the Avena judgment and that
Congress has acquiesced [to] such authority” and (2) that the President had a
separate “international dispute-resolution” authority “wholly apart” from those
“based on the pertinent treaties”).
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falling into Jackson’s first category and the second part eliminated
the possibility of the Memorandum falling in the “zone of twilight” by
restricting valid “zone of twilight” situations.
Medellin’s application of Jackson’s Taxonomy to President Bush’s
authority to issue the Memorandum from “relevant treaties”
The first argument advanced by the United States was that certain
143
treaties give the President the authority to enforce the ICJ decision.
Essentially, the United States argued that the President was
authorized to issue his Memorandum by the Optional Protocol and
the United Nations Charter, either in Jackson’s first category or in
the “zone of twilight,” because the treaties gave the President an
144
Roberts rejected
implied power to implement the ICJ decision.
these arguments, placing the Memorandum firmly in Jackson’s third
145
category.
First, Roberts stated that Congress alone has the power to convert a
non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one; the President
cannot rely on implied powers to take an action that is reserved for
146
Because the Court had already held that the
Congress alone.
147
relevant treaties were “non-self-executing” the President could not
148
rely on them to place his Memorandum in the first category, having
149
As Chief
the “express or implied authorization” of Congress.
Justice Roberts explained, if a treaty is ratified with “the
understanding that it is not to have domestic . . . force,” one can
hardly expect to use it as congressional support for giving it domestic
150
force.
Following this logic, Chief Justice Roberts further held that the
President’s Memorandum could not fall into the “zone of twilight,”
both because unilaterally enforcing a non-self-executing treaty would
be against the “implied will” of Congress, and because there was no
history of congressional acquiescence “remotely involv[ing]
transforming an international obligation into domestic law and
1.

143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States]).
145. See id. at 1368–69 (rejecting the United States’s assertion that the President’s
Memorandum falls within the first category of the Youngstown structure).
146. Id. at 1369.
147. Id. at 1357.
148. Id. at 1369.
149. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
150. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369.
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151

Thus the President’s Memorandum
thereby displacing state law.”
152
Chief
falls into the third category, where it presumptively fails.
Justice Roberts concluded the “treaty power” analysis by stating that
although the President might have the responsibility of complying
153
with the treaty, he must find another way to do it.
Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence on a history of acquiescence for
the “zone of twilight” confirms the “‘longstanding practice’ of
congressional acquiescence” standard more explicitly stated in Chief
154
Justice Roberts’s analysis of the dispute resolution power. Similarly,
Chief Justice Roberts’s requirement that any history of acquiescence
be of the exact kind at issue in Medellin—namely, congressional
acquiescence of presidential domestic enforcement of ICJ
decisions—presages his rejection of the claims settlement cases as
valid precedent. In both arguments the government tried to show
congressional acquiescence of a more generalized power, either

151. Id. at 1368, 1370.
152. Id. at 1369. Chief Justice Roberts argues not only that Congress’s inherent
power to execute “non-self-executing” treaties trumps any inherent powers that the
President might have in this area, but by implication that the President has no
inherent powers in this area. See id. at 1371 (“[T]he Executive cannot unilaterally
execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.”). But see HENKIN,
supra note 111, at 226–27 (emphasizing that several Supreme Court cases allow for
executive domestic execution of international agreements). Theoretically, this
absolves a need to apply Jackson’s taxonomy at all as any action by the President
along these lines would require “the express or implied authorization of Congress”
found in the first category. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 94–95 (pointing out that
Jackson’s taxonomy does not address a case where Congress has exclusive power and
the President has no authority to act).
153. But see Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1369 (“[T]he terms of a non-self-executing treaty
can become domestic law only . . . through passage of legislation by both Houses of
Congress.”). Congress has yet another opportunity to take action in this case,
although it is too late to benefit Jose Medellin. See Request for Interpretation of the
Judgment of 31 March 2004 In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Order of July 16, 2008), at 1, 3, 19, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2008)
(ordering the United States to stay the execution of five Mexican nationals pursuant
to its Avena holding and suggesting that Congress could pass legislation to comply
with its international obligations); James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican
Despite Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at A19 (reporting that Texas executed Jose
Medellin after the Supreme Court rejected a last minute request for a stay of
execution). See generally Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/world-court-seeks-to-block-us-executions/ (July 16, 2008, 12:21
EST) (detailing the new developments in the Avena case).
154. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (finding that the President’s Memorandum did
not meet the requirement of “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional
acquiescence for Presidential action in the “zone of twilight” to succeed); see also infra
Part III.B (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’s treatment of the claimed “dispute
resolution” power). Although Chief Justice Roberts focuses on congressional
“quiescence,” he ignores “inertia” and “indifference,” also parts of Jackson’s “zone of
twilight” definition. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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treaty or dispute resolution, but in both cases Roberts required prior
155
congressional acquiescence of a specific action.
Medellin’s application of Jackson’s Taxonomy to President Bush’s
authority to issue the Memorandum from “inherent” dispute resolution
powers
In arguing for an executive “dispute resolution” power, the
156
government looked to the claims settlement cases
for the
proposition that the President has an independent foreign affairs
157
Chief Justice Roberts
authority to settle international disputes.
158
analyzed this claim exclusively within the “zone of twilight” and
held that this “independent source of authority” does not support the
159
In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts
President’s actions in this case.
established a new standard for “zone of twilight” situations,
theoretically restricting executive action either to Jackson’s first
category or to when the President can point to a textual source of
power in the Constitution.
Chief Justice Roberts cited Dames & Moore for the premise that the
claims settlement cases were “based on the view that ‘a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned’” could “‘raise a presumption
160
that the [presidential] [action] had been [taken]’” with its consent.
2.

155. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370–72 (requiring that the executive action be
accomplished using an executive memorandum to transform an international
obligation into a domestic obligation that displaces state law). As the dissent points
out, there are examples of congressional acquiescence to presidential authority
“transforming an international obligation into domestic law and thereby displacing
state law,” just not based on an ICJ opinion. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370–71, 1390–91
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223, 230–31, 233–
34 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1937)).
156. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371 (majority opinion) (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679–
80 (1981); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330).
157. Id.; see Brief for the United States, supra note 144, at 16 (insisting that the
President has an “established authority to resolve disputes with a foreign government
over the claims of individuals”).
158. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368 (emphasizing before beginning the analysis of
President Bush’s Memorandum that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme
provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area”). For
the “treaty power” analysis, Chief Justice Roberts evaluates all three of Jackson’s
categories; for the “dispute resolution” power, he only appears to examine
congressional acquiescence, the catchword for the “zone of twilight” and the basis for
the claims settlement cases. Id. at 1371–72.
159. Id. at 1371.
160. Id. at 1371–72 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). This
premise is debatable, in part because two of the four cases cited by the Court, Pink,
315 U.S. 203 and Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, drew from the President’s textually based
“recognition power” as opposed to just an implied dispute settlement power. Cf.
HENKIN, supra note 111, at 227 (stating that the decisions in Belmont and Pink did not
appear restricted to just recognition situations). In addition, executive agreements
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Chief Justice Roberts continued, stating that because President
Bush’s Memorandum was “not supported by a ‘particularly
longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence”—that it was in
fact unprecedented—it was not like a claims settlement case and
161
could not take the force of law.
As it is unlikely that Chief Justice Roberts intended this strained
interpretation, a better view is that in order to enable executive
action in the “zone of twilight,” as the claims settlement cases did, the
action would have to be “supported by a ‘particularly longstanding
162
practice’ of congressional acquiescence.”
Put another way, the
presidential action would need to be “based on . . . ‘a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
163
Congress and never before questioned.’” If accurate, this standard
for presidential action in the “zone of twilight” would eliminate
virtually all executive action not based on congressional acquiescence
164
stretching back for however long “long pursued” means.
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that the specific
actions taken by the President have a history of congressional
acquiescence suggests that finding this history will be difficult,
especially where the President is responding to new or unforeseen
165
situations.
The advent of this new standard for the “zone of twilight,” coupled
with the “disabling” Congress standard suggested by Hamdan, reveals
taking the force of domestic law only date back to Belmont itself, which affirmed the
relatively new concept of foreign relations supremacy over state law as the basis for its
decision, not that Congress had acquiesced to the Executive’s action. See Belmont,
301 U.S. at 331 (“In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”); HENKIN, supra note
111, at 226–27 (stating that Belmont rejected the assertion that executive agreements
did not take the force of domestic law and that both Belmont and Pink appeared to
assert a generalized foreign policy supremacy).
161. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. This is a peculiar line of reasoning as the
government was not arguing that Medellin was an actual claims settlement case, but
rather that it was similar to the claims settlement cases in that it drew upon the
President’s foreign affairs power to resolve disputes with other nations based on an
international agreement. See Brief for the United States, supra note 144, at 12–16
(analogizing President Bush’s Memorandum to the claims settlement cases but
actually arguing that the instant case represented less of a unilateral exercise of
executive power—a “modest implementation authority”—than the claims settlement
cases).
162. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 415 (2003)).
163. Id. at 1371–72 (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)).
164. See Am. Ins. Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 415 (explaining that in the claims settlement
cases congressional acquiescence was for “over 200 years”).
165. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (pointing out that although there
was a history of executive action transforming international obligation into domestic
law, Chief Justice Roberts refused to analogize that power to President Bush’s
Memorandum).
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a taxonomy less related to Jackson’s functionalist concurrence than
to Justice Black’s starkly formalistic majority opinion. In order to fall
within the “zone of twilight,” the President must show a “systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned,” a standard that looks like the
166
“implied authorization” located in the first category. The standard
squeezes the first and third categories much closer together,
practically touching, with the President only able to act
independently of Congress where he can point to a textual source of
167
power from the Constitution.
Instead of Jackson’s three categories, the analysis could look more
like this: When the President acts with the express or implied
authorization of Congress—including the implied blessing of a
‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence—
his power is at its maximum; otherwise, he cannot act unless he can
168
point to a textual source of power in the Constitution. This
certainly seems to resemble Justice Black’s brisk refutation of
presidential implied powers, in which he stated “[t]he President’s
[authority] . . . [to act] must stem either from an act of Congress or
169
from the Constitution itself.”
Neither Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown nor its subsequent
application in Dames & Moore support such a stark and demanding
standard for Jackson’s taxonomy.
Displaying his functionalist
mindset, Jackson himself refused to set a definitive standard,
remarking that “any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
170
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables,” and in
addition to congressional “quiescence” also listed “inertia” and
171
“indifference” as enabling presidential action. Jackson, along with
a majority of his colleagues, left open the possibility that President
Truman might have had the power to seize the mills in the absence of
congressional action, an Executive action that does not have a
172
Additionally, examples that
“particularly longstanding practice.”
Jackson gave for “zone of twilight” situations were several Civil War
166. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371–72.
167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (relating examples of executive
power based on constitutional text).
168. But see, e.g., Bellia, supra note 2, at 92 & n.25 (listing scholars who posit that
when the President acts in foreign affairs in the face of congressional inaction—the
“zone of twilight”—his actions are presumptively valid).
169. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
170. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 377–78 n.15 (supposing that a majority of
justices would have upheld executive action had there not been conflicting
legislation).
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cases where President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus in the face
173
Although Congress eventually
of “judicial challenge and doubt.”
ratified President Lincoln’s actions, a President unilaterally
suspending habeas was unprecedented, let alone a “particularly
174
longstanding practice.”
Dames & Moore also does not support this interpretation of the
“zone of twilight.” Justice Rehnquist repeatedly emphasized both the
175
narrowness of Dames & Moore’s holding and the elasticity of
Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy, particularly in situations “involving
responses to international crises the nature of which Congress can
176
hardly have been expected to anticipate in any detail.” A standard
requiring a “particularly longstanding practice” does not seem
especially elastic. As mentioned above, while the Court in Dames &
Moore quotes Frankfurter’s concurrence, it appears to do so as a
standard reflective of claims settlement cases and sufficient for the
177
“zone of twilight,” but not necessarily requisite.
Because major separation of powers cases are relatively rare, and
bona fide “zone of twilight” cases even rarer, it remains to be seen
whether, or how soon, this new standard will have a real world effect.
The next section will attempt to assess a few possible ramifications of
this new standard, particularly as it applies to the executive foreign
affairs and war powers.
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW STANDARD ON SEPARATION-OFPOWERS ISSUES AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
Although the Supreme Court has rarely ruled on significant
178
separation of powers issues between Congress and the President, it
has recently shown a much greater willingness to both check
179
presidential power and uphold Congress’s legislative mandate.
In
173. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 n.3.
174. Id.
175. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660, 688 (1981).
176. Id. at 669.
177. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (arguing, among other points, that
Dames & Moore was a narrow holding focused on the facts at issue and was not
attempting to set a specific “zone of twilight” standard).
178. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (citing various legal scholars
remarking on the relative dearth of Supreme Court opinions rejecting executive
assertions of power in the foreign affairs arena); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732–33 (1996) (recounting that the Supreme
Court has historically rarely ruled on separation of powers cases but that such rulings
“accelerated” with the Reagan administration, generally in the favor of executive
power).
179. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368–69 (2008) (holding that the
legislative power to execute a non-self-executing treaty is solely Congress’s and that
President Bush cannot violate this separation of powers principle); Hamdan v.
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this way Jackson’s tripartite taxonomy, as the “accepted framework
180
for evaluating executive action,” may become more important and
influential than it already is. It follows, then, that a change in the
“accepted framework” could profoundly affect the outcome of future
cases.
The new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy is applicable to any
separation of powers dispute between Congress and the President,
and indeed Jackson’s concurrence has been cited in such diverse
181
182
opinions as Clinton v. New York, Mistretta v. United States, Morrison v.
183
184
Olson,
INS v. Chadha,
and Nixon v. Administrator of General
185
Services. However, it is particularly applicable to foreign affairs and
186
The powers of Congress and the President in
war powers cases.
domestic affairs are “allocated explicitly and according to an
expressed principle,” but in “foreign affairs, much of the
authority . . . is not explicitly allocated to either branch, and even the
explicit division of power between President and Congress conforms
187
to no ‘natural’ [principle].”
Many of the Supreme Court cases
explicitly applying Jackson’s taxonomy have been either foreign
188
189
affairs or war powers cases, suggesting that in these types of cases,
where power is mostly implied and mostly shared, Jackson’s
taxonomy is especially useful.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 616 (2006) (insisting that the President cannot contravene
various “requirements” legislated by Congress); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Setting
the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2352 (2006) (claiming that Hamdan was the first
step in reversing a trend of unremitted executive power aggrandization set into
motion by the Bush Administration); Seth Weinberger, Restoring the Balance: The
Hamdan Decision and Executive War Powers, 42 TULSA L. REV. 681, 692 (2007) (arguing
that Hamdan served as a check on executive power and restored the balance between
congressional and presidential war powers).
180. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1368.
181. 524 U.S. 417, 435 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
183. 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988).
184. 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
185. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
186. See infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
187. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 87.
188. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371–72 (2008) (applying Jackson’s
taxonomy to hold that neither the relevant treaties nor the executive foreign affairs
powers allow the President to enforce the ICJ decision on the states); Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675, 686 (1981) (adopting Jackson’s taxonomy and
holding that the actions of Presidents Carter and Reagan were valid pursuant to the
executive foreign affairs powers and fell either into the first category or the “zone of
twilight”).
189. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590–93 & n.23 (2006) (citing
Jackson’s concurrence for the assertion that congressional legislation overrides use
of the executive war power); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
641-43 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (holding that the President’s war powers do
not allow him to seize steel mills in the face of contrary legislation).
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A. The New Standard and War Powers
The new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy established by Hamdan
and Medellin will likely affect war powers disputes less than foreign
affairs disputes. As one author notes, Congress has for the most part
moved war powers issues from the “zone of twilight” into Jackson’s
190
third category by passing comprehensive legislation.
Even before
Hamdan it was difficult for the President to succeed in the third
category, as the Court would have to “disabl[e] the Congress from
191
Apparently, the United States did not
acting upon the subject.”
192
However, one interesting
even argue this point in Hamdan.
outcome of Hamdan is the effect it could have on the War Powers
193
Resolution of 1973 or another similar provision.
The War Powers Resolution was passed after President Nixon
continued bombing Cambodia after Congress repealed the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, which had given President Nixon the original
194
authority to bomb Cambodian territory.
The War Powers
Resolution placed much of the President’s war powers into the third
195
196
of Jackson’s categories, requiring the President to “consult” with
197
and “report” to Congress before and after introduction of troops
into battle. Additionally, it required the President to withdraw troops
from battle after sixty days unless Congress has declared war or
198
passed a joint resolution authorizing the conflict. President Nixon
199
vetoed the War Powers Resolution, claiming it was unconstitutional,
200
but Congress passed the law despite his objection. Despite the clear
intent of Congress to check presidential power through the War

190. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105 (stating that legislation passed by Congress
after the Vietnam war left presidential war powers in Jackson’s third category);
Daniel J. Freeman, Note, The Canons of War, 117 YALE L.J. 280, 283 (2007) (arguing
that executive action in this area now comes down to a statutory interpretation
analysis).
191. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637–38.
192. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23.
193. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006).
194. See Gary Minda, Congressional Authorization and Deauthorization of War: Lessons
From the Vietnam War, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 943, 983–84 (2007) (explaining that the War
Powers Resolution was intended to “rein in” executive war powers).
195. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105.
196. 50 U.S.C. § 1542.
197. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
198. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b). See generally HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105–11
(describing the motivations for, and criticisms of, the War Powers Resolution, and its
subsequent effect on executive action).
199. E.g., Weinberger, supra note 179, at 689 (asserting that no President after
Nixon accepted the War Power Resolution’s constitutionality).
200. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 105–07.
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201

Powers Resolution, its strictures have largely been ignored or
202
avoided by the executive branch.
Although the War Powers Resolution now appears largely
203
204
irrelevant, and likely unconstitutional, there is every possibility
205
that it or a similar resolution could be used to challenge executive
authority to assert Commander in Chief powers contrary to the
express will of Congress. In such a situation, an analysis under the
new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy would likely “disable” the
President from exercising his war powers in a way contrary to the
relevant legislation, despite the strong arguments for presidential
206
power in this area.
B. The New Standard and Foreign Affairs Powers
It is in the area of foreign affairs, where the power is most implied
and concurrent between the branches, that the new Jackson
207
taxonomy standard could have its greatest effect.
Although the
President has been described as the “sole organ of the nation in its
208
external relations,” and that “the external powers of the United
209
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies,” it
is now unlikely that future presidential actions pursuant to the
executive foreign affairs power will have domestic effect, apart from

201. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 222 (referring to the War Powers Resolution
when stating that “Congress has adopted a standing statutory rule [against] any . . .
inference” that presidential war powers might exist in the “zone of twilight”).
202. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 109–10 (describing various measures that
Presidents have taken to either avoid or ignore the War Powers Resolution).
203. See Minda, supra note 194, at 984–85 (remarking that “presidents have
refused to honor the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, and that neither
Congress nor the courts have seemed to care”).
204. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 111, at 107–08, 125–27 (noting that INS v. Chadha
holds all legislative vetoes presumptively unconstitutional, including the provision in
the War Powers Resolution allowing Congress to terminate hostilities through a
concurrent resolution).
205. See James A. Baker, III & Warren Christopher, Op-Ed., Put War Powers Back
Where They Belong, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at A21 (attempting to inspire efforts to
pass a new and better written war powers resolution that would be more palatable to
the executive branch and easier to implement by Congress).
206. See, e.g., John Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 170, 174 (1996) (arguing that Congress
could oppose “executive war decisions only by exercising its powers over funding and
impeachment”). But see HENKIN, supra note 111, at 107 (“I do not perceive any
constitutional objections to the Resolution in principle.”).
207. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95 (implying that the “zone of twilight” was
especially large in foreign affairs, stating that “surely [in foreign affairs], where the
President admittedly has large power, the fact that Congress can act does not, of
itself, prove that the President could not”).
208. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
209. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
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For good or ill, the
narrowly described claims settlement cases.
211
requirement that there be a “particularly longstanding practice” of
congressional acquiescence to a given presidential action could
potentially circumscribe many courses of action that the President
212
might take.
One example of a situation where the new standard might have
circumscribed executive action is when President Carter, claiming an
inherent foreign affairs power, unilaterally terminated a treaty
213
between the United States and Taiwan. The power to terminate a
treaty is not specifically allocated in the Constitution, although the
power certainly exists, and both Congress and the President have
214
claimed the power to do so. Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to
215
rule on the merits in Goldwater v. Carter, it is now fairly well accepted
that the President does have the power to unilaterally terminate a
216
treaty. However, applying the new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy
reaches a different conclusion. Congress has never explicitly given
the President the generalized power to unilaterally terminate a treaty,
and although there were several instances of a President terminating
a treaty without congressional approval before Goldwater, there was
nothing approaching a “particularly longstanding practice” of
217
congressional acquiescence. This puts President Carter’s action in
the third category, which under the new standard would result in a
nullification of his action as the Constitution does not specifically
218
allocate the power to terminate a treaty to the President.
210. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008).
211. Id. (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)).
212. Cf. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95 (“Presidents, we have seen, have acted
unilaterally in foreign affairs matters which Congress might undoubtedly have
regulated, where Congress had not in fact done so.”).
213. See id. at 213–14 (explaining that when several members of Congress brought
suit arguing that President Carter did not have the constitutional power to
unilaterally terminate a treaty, the Supreme Court refused to rule on the merits but
that the power of the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty is now well
established (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979))).
214. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 211–13 & nn.142–43 (indicating that although
the United States rarely terminates treaties, Congress has occasionally asserted its
authority to do so); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power
Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 249–50 (2001) (pointing out that, like most
foreign affairs powers, the Constitution does not specifically assign the power to
terminate a treaty).
215. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
216. See HENKIN, supra note 111, at 214 (“At the end of the twentieth century, it is
apparently accepted that the President has authority under the Constitution to
denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty . . . .”).
217. See id. at 213 (“[T]he United States has not often been disposed to terminate
treaties.”); id. at 212 & n.138 (stating that President Lincoln was the first President to
terminate a treaty, although that was later approved by Congress, and explaining that
President Roosevelt also denounced several other treaties).
218. Supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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A more recent controversy involving executive foreign affairs
powers concerned not the termination of an international obligation,
as in Goldwater, but instead the creation of an international
obligation, in this case President Bush’s attempt to reach a new status
of forces agreement (“SOFA”) with Iraq through an executive
219
agreement. Although SOFAs have historically been entered into by
the President through executive agreements and without the specific
220
authorization of Congress, critics argued that this particular SOFA
agreed to much more than previous SOFAs have and could prolong
the United States’s involvement in Iraq without Congress’s
221
approval.
President Bush has admitted that this particular agreement will not
222
likely be made, but the new standard for Jackson’s taxonomy would
have invalidated it and would not allow for any similar agreement
223
Congress has not allocated to
contemplated by future Presidents.
224
the President the power to make such a SOFA agreement nor is
there a “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional
225
acquiescence to this type of SOFA agreement. This would leave the
SOFA agreement in the third category, and because the President has
no textually derived power to make executive agreements, the SOFA

219. See generally Michael Abramowitz, Democrats Attack Iraq Security Proposal, WASH.
POST, Jan. 24, 2008, at A9 (reporting that President Bush faced strong opposition
from Democrats in Congress who feared that he was trying use an executive
agreement to keep the United States in Iraq indefinitely).
220. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, An Agreement Without Agreement, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2008/02/15/AR2008021502539.html.
221. See id. (explaining that this agreement would give civilian contractors working
in Iraq immunity for any crime they commit, something that no SOFA had done
before, and that through this SOFA, President Bush unilaterally “threatens to deepen
the American commitment” in Iraq).
222. See Campbell Robertson & Stephen Farrell, Pact, Approved in Iraq, Sets Time for
U.S. Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, November 17, 2008, at A1 (describing the new SOFA
between the United States and Iraq, an agreement different from the one discussed
in this Comment in that it set a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal and eliminated
controversial provisions like prosecutorial immunity for U.S. troops and contractors
who commit certain crimes in Iraq).
223. See Steven Lee Myers, Bush, in a Shift, Accepts Concept of Iraq Timeline, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2008, at A1 (explaining that given Iraqi opposition to the terms of the
SOFA agreement the Bush administration decided to forgo the agreement in its
initial form).
224. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2008/03/what-do-authorizations-for-use-of.html (Mar. 7, 2008, 12:38 EST) (pointing
out that President Bush has not shown legislative support for the SOFA but has used
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and other statutes as support for
continuing combat operations in Iraq).
225. See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 220 (arguing that the terms of this
SOFA are unprecedented and so President Bush cannot rely on previous SOFA
agreements for support).
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226

That this new standard is different from the old
would likely fail.
standard is particularly clear when compared to Dames & Moore,
where the Supreme Court was willing to extend congressional
acquiescence for one type of claims settlement agreement to include
another never seen before, that being the “suspension” of claims in
227
court.
Indeed, Dames & Moore itself might have turned out much different
had this new standard been applied faithfully. Although claims
228
settlement by executive agreement in general had a long history,
the Court could show no examples of the specific action taken by
President Reagan in the “zone of twilight,” such as suspending claims
229
pending in district court. In addition, strictly speaking the Algiers
Accords were not executive agreements but instead “declarations”
drafted by the United States, issued by the Algerian Government, and
230
recognized as executive agreements by the Supreme Court. A court
applying the new standard would find no legislation granting
President Reagan the power to “suspend” claims, and no “particularly
longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence to either
“suspension” of claims or the type of executive agreement at issue.

226. Cf. id. (noting that the President’s Commander in Chief powers only cover
members of the armed forces, not civilian contractors). That at least some members
of Congress were definitely against the SOFA is also demonstrated by a bill
introduced by Senator Clinton that, had it been passed, would have sharply restricted
the President’s ability to conclude such an agreement. See Congressional Oversight
of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007, S. 2426, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007) (mandating that (1)
the President report to Congress his reasons for not submitting the SOFA for
congressional ratification, and demonstrate through legal analysis how his executive
powers derived from the Constitution justify those reasons, and (2) that no funds be
authorized to support any agreement with Iraq that is not ratified by two-thirds of the
Senate).
227. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (finding no previous examples of
executive “suspension” of claims pending in court).
228. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 & n.8, 680 (1981)
(explaining that Presidents have been agreeing to international executive
agreements since at least 1799). But see HENKIN, supra note 111, at 226–27 (stating
that executive agreements taking the force of law within U.S. territory only came
about with Belmont and Pink). Whether congressional acquiescence of executive
agreements taking the force of domestic law was “particularly longstanding” by the
time Dames & Moore was decided might therefore be up for conjecture.
229. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (pointing out that suspension of
claims was unique expression of the claims settlement power at the time of Dames &
Moore).
230. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 663–64; see D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 292 n.4
(explaining that the government of Iran would not sign any agreement with “the
Great Satan”). See generally D’Arcy, supra note 80, at 292 & nn.1-2, & 4 (relating that
the executive agreement in Dames & Moore, known as the Algiers Accords, was agreed
to by the United States in order to free American hostages held by the Iranian
government following the storming of the U.S. embassy in Iran by a “terrorist student
group” in 1979).
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This would leave the Algiers Accords in the last category where it
231
would fail despite its great importance and pressing need.
CONCLUSION
In the words of Louis Henkin, “Justice Jackson did not tell us, or
offer a principle that might help us determine, which powers are
232
concurrent” in the “zone of twilight” with respect to foreign affairs.
Forecasting the effects of this new standard on future presidential
action in the “zone of twilight” is similarly difficult as the President
“exercis[es] the executive authority in a world that presents each day
233
Perhaps Justice
some new challenge with which he must deal.”
Jackson had this reality in mind he said of the “zone of twilight,” “[i]n
this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than
234
on abstract theories of law.” By restricting the “zone of twilight” to
a relatively static definition, Medellin may invalidate presidential
action that, although constitutionally permissible, is mandated by
235
“the imperatives of events” rather than dependent on a “particularly
236
longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence.
Whether or not this is the case, future Supreme Court opinions
dealing with executive power and applying Jackson’s taxonomy as
“the accepted framework” should make it clear whether the changes
to Jackson’s taxonomy made by Hamdan and Medellin were
intentional. Specifically, the Court should specify whether (1)
Congress has a complete disabling power in the third category and
(2) valid executive actions in the “zone of twilight” now require a
long history of congressional acquiescence. In the meantime, the
practical effect of Medellin and Hamdan is to alter Jackson’s taxonomy
from three parts to two, from the functionalism of Justice Jackson to
the formalism of Justice Black.

231. See id. at 293 (explaining that the Court in Dames & Moore was concerned that
a different result would have “done considerable damage to the President’s ability to
deal with foreign sovereigns”).
232. HENKIN, supra note 111, at 95.
233. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662.
234. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
235. Id.
236. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1372 (2008) (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003)).

